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Abstract 
A comprehensive debate on the interface between IP (Intellectual Property) and European 
competition law has emerged over the past 50 years. The initial section of this article 
examines the gradual development of this conflicting relationship between the two laws. This 
is followed by an extensive analysis of the relevant precedent, focusing specifically on the 
significant rulings in Microsoft and IMS Health. The analysis explores the European 
competition authorities’ preference to protect competitors’ interests over achieving the 
general consensus for efficiency in the market and tackles the complex question of whether 
IP holders should be burdened with the responsibility of safeguarding the commercial well-
being of their rivals. In light of the pre-existing case-law, various economic proposals are 
introduced which demonstrate a potential balance between the protection of IPR (Intellectual 
Property Rights) and the intervention of European competition law. It is then assessed which 
proposal will most effectively resolve the conflict between the two laws, and whether this 
proposal is a permanent solution. 
 
 
Introduction 
Most contemporary accounts of European integration began with the implementation of the 
ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) which desired the creation of a united Europe. 
To form closer relations between Member States (MS), a common market was engineered 
‘promoting harmonious development of economic activities throughout the Community’.1 The 
Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) represents the culmination of 50 years Treaty reform with the purpose 
of conceiving a Single Market ’which…would ultimately yield the much vaunted ever closer 
union of the peoples of Europe’.2 However, the economic and political implications of 
forming a Single Market have raised the concern of whether such a market structure will 
protect consumer interests. 
                                                          
1 Burca G., Craig P., EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2011) 5th ed. Oxford University Press p.6. 
2 Weiler. J, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, (1991), 100 Yale LJ 2458. 
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A New Approach was designed through the Cassis de Dijon principle3 which demanded that 
legitimately marketed goods in one MS must be allowed to circulate freely in other MS’, 
ultimately paving the way for the launch of the Single Market. McGee and Weatherill 
suggested that structurally this New Approach will serve European consumers ill.4 They 
proposed that when lobbying European institutions, business groups are better organised 
and funded than consumer groups and hence are more likely to procure changes that favour 
their interests, whilst consumer interests are ignored. This should not be a surprise. 
However, it does raise the question of what sort of Single Market has been formed and more 
pertinently, what affect this market structure had on the development of European 
competition law; which is examined in the following section. 
 
1 Supersession in European Competition Law 
A view of European Competition Law is that efficiency should be produced by allocating: 
 resources…with the individuals or firms that value them most highly. The purest 
 definition of allocative efficiency is Pareto optimality…To achieve optimality, 
 individuals must be allowed to exchange products and services…they value less 
 highly to obtain those that they value more highly from other individuals who value 
 more highly the goods and services that they receive in return.5 
 
Alternatively, economists devised dynamic efficiency which was ‘described as the capacity of 
an economic system to stimulate entrepreneurial creativity and coordination’;6 requiring firms 
to constantly strive to produce new and more effective products. Although the exercise of 
IPR produces allocative inefficiency, IP law argues this to be ‘justified by the dynamic 
incentives’.7 The principles monitoring anti-competitive behaviour within the Single Market 
were originally implemented by the Treaty of Rome (ToR) and addressed under Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC.8 Article 86 will be the sole focus of this article, which is exercised in a 
much more straightforward construction than Article 85. It provides that any: ‘abuse by one 
or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part 
                                                          
3 Established in Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 
[1979] ECR 649, which is laid out more thoroughly in The implementation of the New Approach 
Directives, COM (2003) 240. 
4 McGee A., Weatherill S., ‘The Evolution of the Single Market – Harmonisation or Liberalisation’ 
(1990), 53 MLR 585, p.595. 
5 Jost T., ‘Health Care at Risk: A Critique of the Consumer-driven Movement’ (2007) 1st ed. Duke 
University Press, p.88. European competition law priorities optimality because theoretically perfect 
competition, where consumer welfare is maximised, produces the most efficient goods and services. 
6 Soto J., ‘The Theory of Dynamic Efficiency’, (2009) 1st ed. Routledge Foundations of the Market 
Economy, p.29. 
7 Stiglitz J., ‘Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights’ (2008) Vol. 57:1693 Duke Law 
Journal p.1704. 
8 Initially superseded by Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (Treaty establishing the European 
Community), then further superseded by, Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU (Treaty on the 
Functioning of European Union). 
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of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect 
trade between’ MS.9 To simplify these formalities, in order to benefit firms and enable the 
Commission to tackle serious infringements of competition policy, the Commission launched 
a long process to amend these Articles. This arguably, unbeknown to the Commission, is 
when the tension between exclusive IPR and European completion law in respect of Article 
86 began. 
 
Although IPR are not immune from EU intervention, Article 345 of the TFEU states that the 
‘Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in MS governing the system of property 
ownership’. This blurs the fine line between a MS acceptably exploiting their IPR and 
unacceptably abusing its dominant position. According to the EC, both European competition 
law and IPR are arguably successful at increasing competitors’ incentives to innovate in the 
Single Market.10 However, whether competition law should be used as a tool to limit the 
exploitation of IPR, or whether IPR holders should possess an absolute right in the Single 
Market remains ambiguous. The following case-law explores these points. 
 
2 Microsoft11 
In 1998, Microsoft was accused of refusing SM (Sun Microsystems) access to 
interoperability information to create their own original server products which would operate 
with Microsoft’s Windows PC OS (operating system). The EC launched an investigation into 
Microsoft, with two concerns. Firstly, Microsoft’s bundling of its OS with the Windows Media 
Player. This showed Microsoft’s abuse of monopoly power in their primary market (operating 
software) to exclude competition in the secondary market (applications software12) and, as 
such, leveraged their monopoly power over both markets. Secondly, whether Microsoft’s 
refusal to supply interoperability information to SM had prevented an alternative server being 
designed (without Microsoft Media Player), which had high consumer demand in the 
secondary market. 
 
The EC concluded that anti-competitive behaviour was present, imposing a €497.2 million 
fine and ordering Microsoft to remedy their abusive behaviour. Firstly, by selling another 
version of Windows OS which was independent from the Windows Media Player software, 
                                                          
9 Article 82 of the European Economic Community Treaty 1957; now Article 102 of the TFEU. 
10 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology 
transfer agreements, OJ 2004/C 101/02; the Commission also issued a Report on Competition Policy 
2008, COM (2009) 374. 
11 European Commission, Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty, Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2004] ECR 2977. 
12 I.e. consumers purchasing Microsoft’s OS would also have to purchase Windows Media Player 
application software from Microsoft. 
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creating a bundling remedy.13 Under the interoperability remedy, the EC enforced a 
compulsory licence on Microsoft, requiring them to supply the interoperability information in 
full and to make that information available on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. 
 
The European Courts and EC’s difficulty in defining what circumstances warrant compulsory 
licensing has existed since Volvo v Veng.14 Generally, dominant businesses are free to 
licence their IPR to third parties if it does not amount to infringing competition law. As such, 
Volvo held that IPR holders exercising their exclusive rights, in particular refusing to grant a 
licence, cannot itself be regarded as an abuse of a dominant position.15 Volvo argued that 
when confronted with the tension between European competition law and exclusive IPR, the 
EC should balance the promotion of competitiveness in the market against the IPR holder’s 
incentive to innovate. To exclude liability when refusing to licence IPR, dominant businesses 
were required to provide an objective justification. However, the EC failed to elaborate on 
what constitutes a valid justification. 
 
In Magill,16 the court squandered its opportunity to define abusive conduct and reasserted its 
early Volvo ruling, that ‘the exercise of an exclusive right…may nevertheless be prohibited 
by Article 86…if it involves on the part of the undertaking holding a dominant position, certain 
abusive conduct’.17 Magill ’did’ confirm IPR holders’ exercising their rights can only be 
classed as abusive in ‘exceptional circumstances’,18 however, the court, once again, 
neglected to present a strict rule to determine when parties’ actions classify as ‘exceptional’. 
Variables within the analysis, such as what constituted a ‘new' product, also remained 
undefined. Such ambiguity raised the concern that the floodgates would be opened to an 
influx of courts granting compulsory licences. 
 
In Bronner,19 the content did not primarily concern the licensing of IPR however, the case did 
introduce a clearer refusal to licence framework. The court held that there could be an abuse 
of dominance if: 
                                                          
13 The consequence of this intervention is potentially enormous and unjustified considering all 
companies pre-install software. 
14 Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd. (Volvo Judgment), [1988] ECR 6211. 
15 Ibid, para.8. 
16 Joined [hereinafter Magill]; Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm'n [1991] ECR 11-485; Independent 
Television Publications Ltd. (ITP) v. Commission ("Magill") [1991] ECR 11-575. 
17 Ibid, para.72. 
18 Evrard S., ‘Essential Facilities in the European Union: Bronner and Beyond’, (2004) 10 Colum. J. 
Eur. L. 491 p.11. 
19 Bronner (Oscar) GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitings-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG 
[1998] ECR 7791. 
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 (i) the refusal was likely to eliminate all competition in the…market…; (ii) that such 
 refusal was incapable of being objectively justified; and (iii) that the service in itself 
 was indispensable to carrying on that person’s business, inasmuch as there is no 
 actual or potential substitute in existence.20 
 
Consequently, courts are no longer permitted to grant compulsory licences on the basis that 
IPR holders’ exercise a dominant position in the industry, as in Magill. Instead, the 
circumstances require IPR holders’ to withhold information which is ‘indispensable’ to the 
competitor requesting it or to the industry as a whole. 
 
In Magill, the court suggested that balancing the exclusive IPR against the public’s interest 
could confront the conflicting areas of law. This requires the assessment of the short-term 
and long-term benefits of both laws. In Microsoft21 it was argued ‘European competition law 
is inadequate in such markets…Remedies of forced disclosure of interoperability information 
would have a severely negative impact on innovation, as it would lead to the wholesale 
cloning of Microsoft’s valuable’ IPR.22 In the short-term, encouraging compulsory licensing 
would enable competitors to produce competing products and services, which would 
increase the level of output in the market. However, whatever the supposed short-run gains 
were, the long-run costs of decreasing Microsoft’s incentive to innovate swamped these 
purported benefits, because companies would be reluctant to innovate if they knew ‘the fruit 
of [their] success will be their demise due to…[competition law]…intervention’.23 
 
The ECJ’s latest and most constructive assertion on when a refusal to licence constitutes an 
abuse of competition law was IMS’ ruling.24 The ECJ began by stating ‘that bar for 
exceptional circumstances a refusal to licence is presumptively legal, even if it is the act of a 
dominant company’.25 The ECJ designed criteria to access these exceptional circumstances, 
whereby a refusal to licence IPR constitutes abusive behaviour when: 
‘1. The product or service protected by copyright must be indispensable for carrying 
on a particular business; and 
2. The refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is potential 
consumer demand; and 
3. The refusal is not objectively justified; and 
4. The refusal is such as to exclude all competition on the secondary market’.26 
                                                          
20 As per Ibid, para 41. 
21 Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2004] ECR 2977. 
22 Genakos C., Kuhn K., Reenen J., ‘The European Commission versus Microsoft: competition policy 
in high-tech industries’ (2007) 12 1 Centrepiece, pp.2-7. 
23 Katarzyna C., Komninos A., ‘Competition Law and the Enforcement of Art.102’, (2010) 1st ed. 
Oxford University Press, p.14. 
24 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG (IMS Health Judgment) [2004] ECR 
5039. 
25 Ibid, paras.34-35. 
26 Killick J., ‘IMS and Microsoft Judged in the Cold Light of IMS’ (2004) 1(2) Compl. Rev 23. 
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Considering the similarities, it suggests that the IMS criterion was designed on close 
reflection of the earlier Bronner ruling. Bronner’s criterion was also used in the later Microsoft 
case with the Court of First Instance (CFI) emphasising that a single test ‘cannot be the only 
parameter which determines whether a refusal to license…[IPR]…is capable of causing 
prejudice to consumers within the meaning of’ Article 102.27 
 
Under this philosophy, although Microsoft infringed competition law under Article 102 of the 
TFEU, the EGC did not exclusively reject Microsoft’s position. As such, it is arguable that 
despite Microsoft’s reasoning to protect their invention being unjustified in this case,28 it does 
not exclusively prevent this reasoning being successful in future case-law. However, in the 
latest Microsoft case,29 the EGC rejected all previous limitations of technical development 
and explicitly quoted IMS as the legal precedent for refusal to licence cases.30 This is an 
interesting area of concern that questions how far, if at all, competition law should constrain 
the exploitation of IPR? In order to increase economic growth, it is essential for businesses 
to compete through innovation, with the European software market being no exception. 
Therefore, this suggests that if IPR holders’ profits are curtailed by competition policy and 
their incentives to innovate are reduced, this could negatively impact consumer welfare and 
economic growth. 
 
Competitors’ Interests’ v Competitiveness of Market 
Since the signing of the ToR, there has been significant institutional and substantive change 
to the initial powers of the EEC. These developments resulted in the CJEU and EC taking 
differing approaches to preserving competition. The belief is that:  
‘competition in dominated markets will only have optimal results if…competitors are 
protected from the constraints which follow from the dominance of one firm. 
European authorities…[showed]…a continuing interest in preserving rivalry…by 
protecting firms against the results of intensive competition. Consequently, they have 
been criticised for protecting competitors, not competition’.31 
 
Arguments in favour of Monopoly Structure 
At the opposite ends of the competitive business spectrum, there is perfect competition and 
monopolies. European competition law interprets perfect competition as producing the most 
                                                          
27 Microsoft Corporation v European Commission [2007] ECR 3601, para.647. 
28 Ibid, para 707. 
29 Microsoft Corporation v European Commission [2012] 5 CMLR 797. 
30 This provided a degree of clarity in refusal to licence cases, but left area for improvement by future 
case-law. 
31 As per Akman P., ‘The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approaches’ 
(2012) 1st ed. Hart Publishing Ltd, p.52. And displayed in Instituto Chemioterapico Intaliano Spa and 
Commercial Solvents Corporation v Commission [1974] ECR 223. 
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efficient goods and services, which unsurprisingly results in competition policy rejecting 
monopolies in the market. However, this avoidance is questioned by some - why does EU 
competition policy strongly reject the beneficial effects of a monopoly in the market? 
Especially when, it could be argued that a monopoly market structure maximises incentives 
to innovate which increases efficiency.32 
 
R&D (research and development) plays an essential role in producing ‘profits, productivity, 
economic growth and total welfare’ within markets and consequently, it is crucial to identify 
businesses’ fundamental incentive to invest in R&D. J.A. Schumpeter’s observation of the 
real world and, after ridiculing the value placed in efficiency, was that the most effective 
method of promoting programmes was through the facilitation of monopolies and oligopolies. 
These market structures have the ability to realise economies of scale, to standardise 
production and advance their control on the market to nurture innovations that might not 
immediately be profitable. Contrastingly, as a pioneer for dynamic efficiency, Schumpeter 
saw ‘competition as a ‘gale of creative destruction’,33 stating that the products and processes 
within industries are rapidly renewed and replaced by ‘the new commodity, the new 
technology, the new source of supply, [and] the new type of organization’.34 
 
Monopolies achieve super-normal profits therefore they have the opportunity to invest their 
extra surplus into R&D, further promoting economic growth. Whereas firms within perfectly 
competitive markets instead receive normal profits, and consider it too risky to gamble their 
profits in the long-term benefits of innovation. Consequently, ‘if one wants to induce firms to 
undertake R&D, one must accept the creation of monopolies as a necessary evil’.35 This 
raises the question of whether Microsoft was the necessary evil in the software industry, 
because without them spurring dynamic efficiency, society arguably would not have 
benefited from the maximisation of innovation or growth. 
 
Arguments against Monopoly Structure 
One view is that, in the absence of competition, dominant firms will lack the incentive to 
produce better products or services and will therefore increase costs, negatively impacting 
consumer welfare. This is because despite old technology being renewed and replaced by 
updated technology and the possibility of an existing monopoly being superseded by another 
dominant firm, monopolies’ pure incentive to innovate is to receive super-normal profits. 
                                                          
32 The historic ‘Schumpeter and Arrow debate’ explores this in great depth. 
33 Akman, ‘The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law’, p,22. 
34 Schumpeter J., ‘Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy’ (1976) London: Allen and Unwin 
Publishing, p.83. 
35 Ibid, p.84. 
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Therefore, there is the risk that once a competitor challenges the existing monopoly, their 
incentive to innovate will decrease when super-normal profit becomes unobtainable.36 If 
accurate, it would mean that in monopoly structures solely the active monopoly will be 
incentivised to innovate. In comparison, Etro theorised that monopolies tend to hit back and 
invest more into R&D when their dominant position is threatened.37 Etro suggests that 
without rivals introducing competing products, or at least the threat of doing so, dominant 
firms would not feel the necessary pressure to invest into the production of new products. 
However, despite Etro implying that a dominant firm is capable of ‘hitting back’ with further 
investment in R&D, it still fails to prove that such a monopolistic structure is capable of 
achieving optimal innovation. The competition authorities have argued that this failure is 
because optimality is only attainable in perfectly competitive markets. 
 
Open Innovation 
Boldrin and Levine believe that only companies which innovate at a fast rate are capable of 
obtaining and retaining a dominant position in an industry.38 Applying this theory and 
considering Microsoft’s leading position in the software market since the late 1990’s,39 even 
if superseded by a competitor, Microsoft would not be kept out of the race for long before 
regaining their leading position. As a competitive strategy, firms in the software industry 
conduct their R&D internally in order to gain a competitive advantage. The consequence of 
this restriction on the circulation of R&D information is the lack of exploitation of firms' 
innovative ideas. This process however changed dramatically with the introduction of open 
innovation, which acts as a ‘paradigm that assumes…firms can and should use external 
ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as the firms look to 
advance their technology’.40 This prevents wastage of innovative ideas and advances the 
market by businesses disclosing their internal ideas. Microsoft has balanced the circulation 
of their ideas against the retention of other internal ideas which they keep for competitive 
advantage. This produces vast advantages for fellow competitors and advances economic 
growth, which suggests that monopolies contributing to open innovation are benefiting the 
market, even if they retain some internal ideas for their own competitive advantage through 
exercising their exclusive IPR. 
                                                          
36 Especially in comparison to that in a competitive market, as suggested by Arrow K., ‘Economic 
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’ in the Rate and the Allocation of Resources of 
Invention’ (1962) 13 (13) Cambridge: NBER p.619. 
37 Etro F., ‘Market Leaders, Antitrust Policy and the Software Market’ (2008) 5 (1) The Icfai Journal of 
Industrial Economics p.17. 
38 Boldrin M., Levine K., ‘Against Intellectual Monopoly’ (2010), 1st ed. Cambridge University Press 
pp.19-23. 
39 Showing its ability to innovate at a fast rate. 
40 Chesbrough H., Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating And Profiting from Technology 
(2005, 1st ed. Harvard Business Review Press) p.24. 
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3. IMS Health 
IMS Health specialises in the consolidation and supply of German regional sales data to 
pharmaceutical corporations. IMS’ database consists of a grid superimposed on the map of 
Germany which is divided into 1860 geographical areas, known as 'bricks’. The brick 
structure had evolved by IMS’ consumers tailoring it into ‘their own information systems and 
sales structures’.41 This was problematic for IMS rivals as the brick structure was labelled 
the de facto industry standard, therefore it needed to be adopted for them to supply their 
own information. In order to safeguard their investment, IMS requested copyright protection 
over the brick structure. When NDC applied to IMS for a licence to use their brick structure, it 
was refused. Later, after further court proceedings, NDC filed a complaint with the EC stating 
their rights had been breached under Article 82 of the EC. NDC argued that IMS’ brick 
structure was an ‘essential facility, without which it could not compete in providing a rival 
regional sales service’.42 Relying on Magill and Bronner as precedent, the EC held that the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ test was fulfilled in IMS and as an interim measure, enforced a 
compulsory licence on IMS for all companies that aspired to provide German regional sales 
data.43 IMS appealed to the CFI, which held that the EC had exceeded its powers under 
these interim procedures and had applied a remedy which was too ‘far reaching’.44 
Furthermore, in later proceedings the EC's interim decision was withdrawn. This ruling 
yearned for clarity, as despite the interim decision being deemed too extreme, the ECJ did 
not exclusively answer whether IMS’ actions constituted an ‘exceptional circumstance’.45 
In regards to the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, IMS did not interpret the legal standard 
laid down in Magill and Bronner, but instead re-introduced the test as ‘cumulative’ and 
applied that a refusal to licence would constitute an abuse of dominance when: 
 
‘1. The product or service protected by copyright…[was]…indispensable for carrying on a 
particular business; and 
2. The refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is potential 
consumer demand; and 
3. The refusal is not objectively justified; and 
                                                          
41 Houdijk J., ‘The IMS Health Ruling: Some Thoughts on its Significance for Legal Practice and its 
Consequences for Future Cases such as Microsoft’ (2005) 6, European Business Organization Law 
Review, p.469. 
42 Furse M., Competition Law of the EC and UK (2006), 5th ed. Oxford University Press, p.397. 
43 IMS Health Inc. (Interim measures) (2002/165). 
44 IMS Health Inc. v Commission [2002] 4 CMLR 1.  
45 The withdrawal of the interim measures did not exclude the possibility that the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ test was satisfied, but instead showed the CFI’s belief that the EC had overstepped 
their authority. 
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4. The refusal is such as to exclude all competition on the secondary market’.46 
 
This provided a new legal standard for the exceptional circumstances test, which the court 
specified was non-exclusive. The ECJ affirmed the test’s strictness in identifying abuse and 
stated ‘it is for the national court to examine, if appropriate, in light of the facts before it, 
whether the refusal of the applied request for a licence is justified by objective 
considerations’.47 This remark however, is too vague and ‘far-reaching’ to assist national 
courts and businesses. Until further clarity is provided, it is arguable this process will remain 
seriously hampered and produce ambiguous results. 
 
Questions Unanswered by the IMS Ruling 
What ‘constitutes a 'new product' and in which stage of development does this new product 
have to be…[when]…a court must pass judgement on abuse of a dominant position?’48 To 
introduce a ‘new’ product, there must be a distinction between the ‘new’ product and those 
already active in the market. 
 
In Magill, the ‘Court did not define what it meant by a ‘new product’ in highlighting that a 
refusal prevents the emergence of a new product’.49 Magill did however illustrate, that in 
IMS’ circumstances, NDC could have claimed originality simply by altering the brick 
structures’ geographical locations. This paved a way for an expansion on the definition of a 
‘new’ product however, no specific guidance was provided for when this was applicable. 
Without a clear definition, the national court in IMS was instructed to consider the volume of 
participation by the pharmaceutical laboratories in the improvement of the 1860 brick 
structure. The high dependency on the structure proved that laboratories ’would have to 
make exceptional organisational and financial efforts in order to acquire a product based on 
another structure’.50 This uncertainty surrounding the ‘new product’ component was enough 
for the ‘cumulative’ test to fail and IMS to escape the imposition of a compulsory licence. 
 
When evaluating the 'indispensability' of IPR, the ECJ implied that IMS consumers had 
widely contributed towards the development of IMS’ IPR. IMS explained that the 
development and improvement of the original product was in response to user feedback. 
                                                          
46 IMS Health Judgment, para 37. 
47 Ibid, para 51. 
48 Houdijk J., ‘The IMS Health Ruling: Some Thoughts on its Significance for Legal Practice and its 
Consequences for Future Cases such as Microsoft’, p.485. 
49 Evrard S., ‘Essential Facilities in the European Union: Bronner and Beyond’, p.12. 
50 Ramsauer T., ‘Just Another Brick? The European Court of Justice on the Interface between 
European Competition Law and Intellectual Property’ p.5, Available: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001396/139653e.pdf. Last accessed 6th December 2015. 
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Competitors and the ECJ suggested IMS users significantly enhanced IMS’ success and 
were too central to the production process for IPR protection. If proven, the ECJ would have 
held IMS unable to claim independent design of the brick structure. However, IMS argued 
that whilst providing feedback, the users were not directly involved in the development 
process and ultimately could not have contributed to IMS’s success to any significant 
degree. If the former approach was adopted, it would have been problematic because it 
requires the Courts to identify when IPR holders have received too much assistance from 
third parties, which is arguably immeasurable. Considering this difficulty, the court instead 
observed that IMS’ product was improved to suit the requirements of their users, in order for 
consumers to adopt their own system to fit within the IMS system. Hence, the development 
of indispensability became apparent over time when it was identified that the pharmaceutical 
industry had a degree of dependency on the structure and no production of an alternative 
product was viable.51 As such, it is implied that NDC should have had little difficulty proving 
this condition of indispensability. 
 
The Interface between Competition Law and IP Law 
The ‘most’ significant difference between Magill and IMS is the requirement for a ‘new 
product’ (in IMS). This interprets as ‘the ECJ employing a strict demarcation for the 
application of competition law to the exercise of IPR and that the IMS ruling confirms a far-
reaching autonomy of (the exercise of) IPR.52 
 
When the ECJ declared that the ‘exceptional’ conditions introduced in Magill were successful 
in IMS, this raised concern for IP lawyers because the application of this test was deemed 
appropriate in the primary ‘and’ secondary markets. To understand the true gravity of IP 
lawyers’ concern, it is essential to explain that secondary markets produce products that are 
solely purchased as a result of consumers buying products in the primary market. 
AG Tizzano set out: 
‘…that, for the purposes of the application of…earlier case-law, it is sufficient that a potential 
market or even hypothetical market can be identified. Accordingly, it is determinative that two 
different stages of production may be identified and that they are interconnected, inasmuch 
as the upstream product is indispensable for the supply of the downstream product’.53  
 
Applying this concept to IMS, the brick structure would constitute as an indispensable 
upstream factor in the downstream supply of German regional sales data for pharmaceutical 
                                                          
51 This was apparent considering no structure could match the sophisticated developments made in 
IMS, as expressed by Colston C., Middleton K., Modern Intellectual Property Law (2005) 2nd ed. 
Routledge Publishing, p.103. 
52 Houdijk J., ‘The IMS Health Ruling: Some Thoughts on its Significance for Legal Practice and its 
Consequences for Future Cases such as Microsoft’, p487. 
53 IMS Health Judgment, para 44. 
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products. It is the economic perspective that IPR holders will be more lenient to licence their 
IPR in a secondary market, since this market would not affect their core activities on the 
primary market. However, enforcing compulsory licences in both primary and secondary 
markets under IMS’ criteria could have a significant impact on IPR holders' return in 
investment. The court uses the ‘introduction of a new product’ condition to ensure 
competitors applying for a licence to IPR never end up in direct competition with the IPR 
holder. It is intended for competitors to keep a certain distance from the IPR holders and 
ultimately form their own submarket. For this to be achieved, the product or service must be 
classified as ‘new’ in terms of supply and demand to ensure competitors applying for a 
licence are in a distinct market to the IPR proprietor. This interpretation should prevent IPR 
holders being threatened by the enforcement of compulsory licences in the primary market. 
 
Conversely, there is conjecture that where a truly derivative market exists, a less stringent 
application for the demand of the newness of a product or service may be required to satisfy 
this condition. The drawback to encouraging such an approach is that it diminishes the 
clarity of the criteria. To project legal certainty this criteria requires consistent interpretation. 
If consistency is unobtainable through this test, it is arguable that the market is desperate for 
a new approach. 
 
The Validity of IMS’ Test 
IMS relates to the interface between competition and copyright law. As such, its ruling is not 
explicitly directed on the clash between competition policy and all types of IPR. 
Consequently, it may be interpreted that IMS’ conditions are not sophisticated enough to 
resolve the complex situations between competition and IP law as a whole. Attempting to 
clarify this issue, it is necessary to identify situations where IMS’ criteria is not fulfilled but the 
courts still find an abuse of dominance under Article 102 of the TFEU. 
 
Abusive behaviour is apparent where an undertaking possesses IPR for the production of 
certain components and decides to cease the production of such goods, and refuse a 
licence to competitors which intend to satisfy the existing demand in the market. ‘This is a 
slightly different criterion than the standard of impeding the introduction of a new product, 
formulated in IMS, but boils down to the same…[principle that in]…both cases, consumers 
would be denied a product for which a demand exists’.54 
 
                                                          
54 As suggested by Houdijk J., ‘The IMS Health Ruling: Some Thoughts on its Significance for Legal 
Practice and its Consequences for Future Cases such as Microsoft’, p.490. 
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Another alternative interpretation of the 'exceptional circumstances' test is needed for the 
software industry. Granting the disclosure of limited information will depend on the basis of 
whether the competitor intends to use this information to produce its own well-functioning 
software product, or, for their ambition to use the IPR holders’ exclusive grip on the market. 
Thus, to restrict competitors from producing an identical replica of IPR holders’ original 
product, the courts must include this consideration in the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test.55 
 
It has also been questioned whether combining the elimination of production and monopoly 
leveraging factors within IMS’ test is appropriate. AG Tizzano endorsed the view that a 
refusal to licence constitutes an abuse only is extreme and ‘cumulative’ circumstances. 
However, post-IMS, critics have submitted that the ‘refusal to exclude all competition in the 
secondary market’ component constitutes two independent types of abuse.56 ‘If the quality of 
the products offered on the neighbouring market are equal and if innovative efforts are 
constantly made, a new product that is not offered…[to competitors]…by the IP owner 
constitutes abuse of a dominant position because one condition, i.e. the limiting-of-
production test’ would be unfulfilled.57 It is considered that perhaps ’in the not too distant 
future, exceptional circumstances in which competition law intervention is justified will no 
longer be the empirical exception but the daily bread of competition policy’.58 Evidenced by 
the scenarios above, it is clear that the approach adopted in IMS is not appropriate for 
identifying all circumstances where an abuse of a dominant position may arise. Therefore, 
the implementation of a stricter economic approach could be argued as necessary to allow 
more competitive intervention. However alternatively, the European authorities could reject 
this motion for more competitive intervention, and instead focus on achieving a balance 
between these conflicting tools. 
 
4. The ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ Test 
The courts’ gradual shift towards issuing compulsory licences could be described as its 
inclination to prioritising European competition policy above IP law. Initially, the court 
focused on the ‘economic right of the innovator to receive appropriate remuneration’.59 In 
                                                          
55 Microsoft’s justification for refusing to grant SM a licence was the concern SM would identically 
replicate their “crown jewels” (Windows’ Sourcing Codes). Therefore, under this standard, the EC’s 
2004 Microsoft ruling should have included this consideration. 
56 The leveraging condition requires two distinct markets whereas eliminating production concerns 
only one independent market. 
57 Heinemann A., ‘Compulsory Licences and Product Integration in European Competition Law - 
Assessment of the European Commission's Microsoft Decision’, (2005) 36(1) IIC, p.73. 
58 Atanasiu I., Ehlermann C., ‘European Competition Law Annual 2005: The Interaction between 
Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law’ (2007) 1st ed. Bloomsbury Publishing, p.664. 
59 Angelov M., ‘The “Exceptional Circumstances” Test: Implications for FRAND Commitments from the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine Under Article 102 TFEU’ (2014) 10 (1) Euro. C.J, p.64. 
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Volvo, the courts held ‘the right of the proprietor of a protected design to prevent third parties 
from manufacturing…selling or importing without consent…[as]…the very subject-matter of 
his exclusive right’.60 Therefore Volvo’s ‘very subject-matter’ approach prioritised IP over EU 
competition law issues. Magill’s61 introduction of the ‘exceptional circumstances test’ 
arguably altered this balance, tilting the scale towards the prioritisation of European 
competition law. 
 
The Importance of Achieving a Balance between the Two Regimes 
Prior case-law has insisted that the court must decide on either the supremacy of IPR or 
competition law. This is arguably a flawed approach considering the complexity of this 
interfacing dispute. As such, striking ‘a balance between the anti-competitive and pro-
competitive effects of a refusal to licence…and incorporating considerations of both 
allocative and dynamic efficiency’, could be a more practical remedy.62 
 
IPR and competition law share the common goal of advancing consumer welfare and, as 
such, both include considerations for allocative and dynamic efficiency.63 The distinction 
between these two regimes is the different degree of emphasis placed on these separate 
efficiencies. Allocative efficiency requires effective production and lower prices on goods and 
services, which is the primary focus of competition law. In contrast, dynamic efficiency aims 
to produce the newest and highest quality goods and services through protecting IPR 
holders’ incentives to innovate, which is the primary concern of IP law. To resolve the conflict 
between these two laws a balance struck between allocative and dynamic efficiency is 
crucial. 
 
Pre-existing Literature 
This balancing approach between anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects was 
acknowledged by the US courts, which formed an open-ended balancing exercise under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act 1890 to apply on a case-by-case basis. The EC developed an 
alternative approach to the US’s exercise,  
‘which gives enforcement priority to conduct leading to anti-competitive foreclosure of 
competitors, subject to the incumbent’s right of ‘justification’ by demonstrating that its 
                                                          
60 Ibid at para 19. 
61 Magill (RTE and Independent Television Productions v Commission) [1995] 4 CMLR 418. 
62 Kwok K., ‘A New Approach to Resolving Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights Disputes’ 
(2011) 34 (2) World Competition Law and Economics Review, p.261. 
63 As suggested by Pepperkorn L., ‘IP Licences and Competition Rules: Striking the Right Balance’ 
(2003) 26, World Competition Law and Economics Review, p.527. 
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conduct produces substantial efficiencies which outweigh any anti-competitive effects on 
[the] consumer’.64  
 
In Microsoft,65 this approach was adopted to consider whether Microsoft’s incentives to 
innovate could constitute an ‘objective justification’, which outweighs any anti-competitive 
impact Microsoft have on the industries’ as a whole. The EC identified that there are specific 
limitations to balancing these concepts on incentives. 
 
First, this test excluded consideration of allocative efficiency and instead focused solely on 
dynamic efficiency, concentrating on the adverse effects of Microsoft’s incentive to innovate 
along with the advancements in dynamic efficiency which increases follow-on innovation for 
the whole industry. However, this only considered the short-term effects of issuing Microsoft 
with a compulsory licence and neglected to consider the long-term impact on competitors. 
Consequently, this balancing process will systematically over-emphasise the benefits of 
mandatory access and under-emphasise the benefits of protecting the IPR holder’s 
incentives to invest. Although this test was rejected in the later Microsoft case,66 it was 
stressed that this decision was based on the invalidity of the argument provided by Microsoft 
(the cloning of their software), and not the EC’s direct disapproval of this balancing process 
regarding innovation.67 The EC's ruling contributed to ‘a new level of uncertainty, based 
partly on its attempted micromanagement of competition on a case-by-case basis’.68 Turney 
supports this conclusion by stating that ‘it is tempting to treat the essential facilities dilemma 
on a case-by-case basis. However, this uncertainty is particularly problematic for market 
participants and does nothing to ensure the coherence of a competition regime’.69 
 
In contrast, Kaplow has proposed a sophisticated framework balancing the differing 
objectives of competition law and patent policy, i.e. essentially assessing the ‘trade-off 
between patentee reward and innovation incentives’.70 Kaplow submits that IP practices, 
including the refusal to licence, should be permitted if the resulting profits outweigh the harm 
                                                          
64 Kwok K., ‘A New Approach to Resolving Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights Disputes’, 
p.271. 
65 Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2004] ECR 2977. 
66 Rejected by the EGC (General Court), which prior to the execution of the ToL was called the CFI 
(Court of First Instance). 
67 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR 3601, para 710. 
68 Byrne D., ‘Compulsory licensing of IP rights: has EC competition law reached a clear and rational 
analysis following the IMS judgement and the Microsoft decision?’ (2007) 2 (5) J.I.P.L.P, p.324-330. 
69 Turney J., ‘Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine on Intellectual Property Rights: 
The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation’ (2005) 3 North-western Journal of Technology and 
Intellectual Property, p.187. Also criticised by Ahlborn C., Evans D., Padilla A., ‘The Logic & Limits of 
the “Exceptional Circumstances Test” in Magill and IMS Health’, p.1156: ‘A case-by-case test, like the 
Commission's test in Microsoft, constitutes…an invitation to error’. 
70 Kaplow L., ‘The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal’ (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev, p.1813. 
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suffered.71 Completely restricting IP practices goes against the underlying assumption that 
increasing reward to the patentee ‘in turn encourages inventive activity, which in turn 
produces social benefits’.72 This led Kaplow to design a ‘ratio test’ for when the competition 
authorities should intervene.73 However, it was deemed impossible to produce ratios for 
every patent practice that exists considering the lack of information provided by the 
companies to base the ratio. As such, instead of attempting to produce a quantitative 
analysis of the ratio, it was considered more appropriate to produce a qualitative approach 
‘to prohibit at least those practices that exhibit a serious potential for substantial loss’.74 
‘Factors aiding in the application of this test to specific practices, include the extent to which 
the reward is pure transfer, the portion of the reward that accrues to the patentee, and the 
degree to which the reward serves as an incentive’.75  
 
However, there is the concern that these three factors refer to patentee reward, which is 
difficult to quantify with regards to Article 102 practices.76 In such practices, long-term 
rewards can only be achieved when the monopoly has driven out competitors and can earn 
super-normal profits through the increase in pricing. Grimes and Sullivan suggested that 
patentees who acquire monopoly power through anti-competitive practices, especially the 
refusal to licence, will not enjoy their riches for long considering their tendency to squander 
them through productive inefficiency.77 Therefore, when applying Kaplow’s ratio test, it could 
be deemed more appropriate to directly examine the balance between incentives to innovate 
and monopoly loss, instead of focusing on the complicated concept between patentee 
reward and incentives to innovate. This alternative qualitative approach could prevent further 
complications arising in Kaplow’s ratio balancing test. 
 
Contrastingly, Crane rejected Kaplow’s analysis, arguing that enforcing compulsory licences 
would coerce unwilling business relationships. Crane’s submission could be deemed to over-
                                                          
71 Therefore balancing the patentee benefits against the cost of patent protection, i.e. the decrease in 
allocative efficiency through an increase in prices and decrease in output. 
72 Kaplow L., ‘The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal’, p.1823. 
73 He explained that if the patentee reward ratio is measured over the monopoly loss and the ratio 
exceeds one, the competition authorities should not intervene. 
74 Kaplow L., ‘The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal’, p.1888. 
75 Ibid, p.1842. 
76 It is therefore questionable whether these three factor are solely applicable to Article 101 of the 
TFEU agreements, or if they can extend to Article 102 of the TFEU practices. 
77 Grimes W.; Sullivan L., ‘The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook’ (2006), 2nd ed. West 
Academic Publishing, p.84. This view may be contradicted in scenarios where the patent relates to 
the production process itself. However, for all other circumstances it was suggested that the 
‘possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses 
energy…[and]…that immunity from competition is narcotic, and rivalry is stimulant to industry 
progress’, as per Judge Hand in United States v Aluminium Co of America (1945) 148 F.2d 416, 427 
(2nd Cir). 
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estimate the amount of interaction compulsory licences force on the parties involved, 
especially considering Microsoft suggested this exchange is kept to a minimum.78 However, 
this is arguably different in patent cases, since despite compulsory licencing allowing 
competitors to work the patented invention without risk of infringement, it would not 
necessarily enable them to work it in the most efficient or effective way79. This is because 
working a patented invention often requires unpatented “know-how” and skilled personnel.  
As such, voluntary patent licences are commonly accompanied by extensive agreements 
relating to disclosure of “know-how” and training of personnel; emphasising Crane’s point 
that compulsory licences are unlikely to produce optimal outcomes in this context.80 Crane 
emphasised that the exclusive IPR of refusing a licence interacts with circumstantial 
factors.81 Crane’s theory explained how Kaplow’s ratio test in refusal to licence cases 
‘decreases with the number of aggravating circumstantial factors. Consequently 
his…[study]…emphasised that the anti-competitive effects may eventually outweigh the pro-
competitive effects of allowing the refusal’.82 
 
This pre-existing literature gives important insights, which must be reflected on prior to 
adopting a new framework. The potential effects a refusal to licence will have on consumer 
welfare and the different efficiencies must be examined. It is also vital for competition 
authorities to balance the pro and anti-competitive effects of a refusal to licence. In order to 
fulfil the latter condition these ‘effects’ must first be acknowledged. Anti-competitive effects 
include restricting a new rival entering the market or excluding a pre-existing competitor, 
which inadvertently results in allocative inefficiency and can potential decrease follow-on 
innovation. Alternatively, the pro-competitive justification for permitting a refusal to licence 
stems from the principle of preserving participants’ incentives to innovate. Ironically, when 
reflecting on these competitive effects, it implies that the more successful a firm’s innovation 
is, the more likely it will be considered anti-competitive and subject to compulsory licencing. 
As such, this identifies why increasing compulsory licencing will decrease firms incentives to 
innovate.83 
                                                          
78 I.e. the competition authorities determine the licensing fee for the information provided and appoint 
a monitoring trustee to ensure payments are transferred. 
79 When obtaining a patent, the inventor is required to disclose their invention in the patent 
application, which then becomes a public document. Competitors gain access to this information 
contained in the patent application, but they are prevented from working the invention without the 
permission of the patent owner, for the duration the patent exists. 
80 As per Hovenkamp H., Janis M., Lemley M., ‘Unilateral Refusals to License in the US’, Antitrust, 
Patents and Copyright – EU and US perspectives’ (2005) 1st ed. Edward Elgar p.34. 
81 Crane D., ‘Intellectual Liability’ (2009) 88 Texas Law Review, p.253. 
82 Kwok K., ‘A New Approach to Resolving Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights Disputes’, 
p.273. 
83 Because the more money firms invest in R&D ultimately means the more super-normal profit 
eliminated by compulsory licences. 
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Finally, a new framework must assess the links of causation. I.e. (i) does the refusal: 
‘in fact, lead to the likely exclusion of a competitor; (ii) [does the]…exclusion [actually] 
aggravate…[allocative and dynamic]…inefficiency; and (iii) [is it] the right to exclude under 
IPR protection [which actually]…drives innovation in the industry at issue’.84 
 
Striking the Balance 
Crane’s analysis indicated that authorities will consider refusals to licence as anti-
competitive when the amount of aggravating factors present increases. Therefore, a new 
approach to resolve the conundrum between European competition law and IPR could be 
formed by identifying how the refusal at issue interacts with various circumstantial factors.85 
A non-exhaustive list of aggravating factors has been developed through case-law to identify 
what anti-competitive effects a refusal to licence can produce, consisting of: (A) market 
power; (B) network effects; (C) monopoly leveraging; (D) predatory intent; (E) degree of 
follow-on innovation. Overall these factors identify the anti-competitive effects of a refusal to 
licence by reflecting on the entry barriers for competitors (A-D) and the amount of allocative 
and dynamic inefficiency which is predicted from this restriction and exclusion (E).86 
If a refusal to licence is concluded as being anti-competitive under these factors, it must be 
compared against the pro-competitive justification provided by the parties.87 Determining 
whether such a justification can outweigh the anti-competitive impacts of a refusal will 
depend on the link between the protection of IPR and the incentives to innovate. The 
complexity of this proposed framework suggests that these concepts are scrutinised 
differently depending on the industries involved.88 
 
Aggravating Factors 
A. What relevant market does the competitor fall into? In refusal to licence cases, the 
European competition authorities developed a two-market approach where ‘a monopolist 
                                                          
84 Kwok K., ‘A New Approach to Resolving Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights Disputes’, 
p.274. 
85 Suggested by Kwok K., ‘A New Approach to Resolving Refusal to License Intellectual Property 
Rights Disputes’. 
86 The first four aspects refer to barriers which restrict or exclude access to the market for new 
competitors or existing rivals, whereas the degree of follow-on innovation (e) refers to the aftermath of 
this exclusion. 
87 Typically justifications are aimed at motivating parties’ incentives to innovate. 
88 Turney emphasised that assessing the anti-competitive effects on a case-by-case basis produces 
irregularity however examining cases on an industry-by-industry basis could provide much needed 
clarity in this application. The following section analyses these aggravating circumstantial factors and 
the IPR-incentives relationship in reflection of pre-existing case-law. 
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who acquires a dominant position in one market through…[IPR]…,exploits that dominant 
position to enhance a monopoly in another market’.89 The authorities designed an approach 
differentiating the two markets: ‘an upstream market for the input refused and a downstream 
market for the end product incorporating that input’.90 Case-law showed that this definition of 
a relevant market produced complications, i.e. Microsoft implied that the only relevant 
market in this two-market approach is ‘the end product market’.91 
 
‘Market definition for goods protected by patents or other…[IPR are]…usually determined by 
the characteristics of the good itself…[therefore]…the nature of the products , the demand 
for them, and the relative ease of supply’.92 Such an analysis of the parties’ characteristics 
should help identify which market is appropriate for the competition authorities to consider in 
light of anti-competitive activities.93 Once a relevant market has been established, it must 
then be assessed how much power the IPR holder has acquired in that market. Microsoft 
suggested that in order to calculate the monopoly’s market power, it must be identified 
whether their IPR are ‘indispensable’ in the end product market.94 To determine the 
indispensability of a product, the ‘as-efficient competitor test’ was formed identifying which 
competitors' appeals should be dismissed in light of IPR holders’ refusal to licence.95 The 
competition authorities explored whether, by granting the licence, the competitors could 
compete effectively against the IPR holder considering their superior position in the market. 
Indispensability increases in parallel with the chances of the competitor being restricted or 
eliminated from the market, therefore the higher the chance of restriction or elimination, the 
more significant the anti-competitive effects of the refusal. 
 
The ‘as-efficient competitors test’ could have been used in Magill because the publishing 
company would have been ‘unable to produce’ their end-product without the granting of the 
licence. Contrastingly, in IMS, NDC did not require their brick structure to obtain working 
contracts with other companies therefore it was not indispensable to their end-product 
                                                          
89 Image Technical Services Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co [1997] 125 F.3d 1195 9th Cir, 1215-1216. 
90 Kwok K., ‘A New Approach to Resolving Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights Disputes’, 
p.275. 
91 Its significance was based on the fact that parties’ are competing for this ‘end market’ to produce 
their product. 
92 Hovenkamp H., Janis M., Lemley M., ‘Chapter 4: Intellectual Property and Market Power’, in IP and 
Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law’ (2002) 1st ed. New 
York: Aspen Law & Business, p.4–44. 
93 I.e. Microsoft’s product markets were recognised as the server OS ‘and’ applications software 
market, and the pharmaceutical sales reports market was identified for IMS. 
94 This is necessary to identify because, in the absence of compulsory licencing, competitors may be 
restricted or eliminated from the industry due to there being no available substitute. 
95 As advocated in Bronner (Oscar) v Mediaprint, paras 45–46. 
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market. As such, refusal to licence cases should be assessed in light of the ‘as-efficient 
standard’ before any action is taken by the competition authorities. 
B. Microsoft is a prime example of an industry characterised by both direct network effects 
and indirect network effects.96 Market tipping ‘occurs when one firm has attracted a critical 
mass of consumers and complementary applications, forcing other competitors to leave the 
market’,97 and results in consumers being reluctant to change software companies.98 Even if 
consumers of the monopoly were willing to change company for the improved product, ‘the 
entrant may have to offer a deal that is considerably better than the value of the 
improvement’.99 Also despite this superior deal proving to be successful in the short-run, it 
could increase the monopoly’s incentive to further innovate and create improvements more 
advanced than their rivals.100 This would tighten their grasp on the industry, providing 
monopolies with further opportunities to use network effects as a restrictive measure for 
future competitors. 
 
‘Since…a product with huge network externalities is already protected against competition 
through its natural monopoly characteristics, IPR might be generally less important for 
providing innovation incentives’.101 Consequently, European competition authorities should 
perhaps intervene more frequently in these circumstances, especially where the direct and 
indirect effects are acting as barriers to the market.102 
                                                          
96 Direct network effects arise from the increasing attractiveness of a product parallel with demand. 
Indirect network effects accompany consumers’ expanding interest in the product with additional 
complementary products and applications. 
97 Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2004] ECR 2977, para 420, n. 536 – ‘A product market is said to 
exhibit network effects when the overall utility derived by consumers who use the product in question 
is dependent not only on their private use of the product, but also on the number of other consumers 
who use the product. Such a network effect is a direct network effect. An indirect network effect 
occurs when the value of a good to a user increases as the number and variety of complementary 
products increase’. 
98 As when forcing competitors to leave the market, Microsoft have restricted other competitors 
entering the market by ‘increasing [the] number of consumers…locked into a homogenous Windows 
solution’, which of course makes consumers unlikely to change software companies and welcome 
new competitors to the market. As discussed by Paradolesi R., Renda A,, ‘The European 
Commission’s Case against Microsoft: Kill Bill?’ (2004) 27 World Competition Law and Economics 
Review, p.513, 527. 
99 I.e. the competitor entering the market must be substantially superior to the improved product or 
service presented by the IPR holder active on the market. As implied by: Scotchmer S., ‘Innovation 
and Incentives’ (2004) London: The MIT Press, p.296. 
100 As per Etro F., ‘Market Leaders, Antitrust Policy and the Software Market’, p.17. 
101 Kerber W., Schmidt C., ‘Microsoft, Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights, and the 
Incentive Balance Test of the EU Commission’ (2008) Faculty of Business Administration and 
Economics, Philipps Universität Marburg, Am Plan 2, D-35032 Available: 
http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2008/kerber_schmidt.pdf. Last accessed 6th December 2015. 
102 As demonstrated in Microsoft. In IMS, there was less of a concern regarding these network effects 
because NDC was not restricted and the software consumers were not discouraged from changing 
servers, unlike in Microsoft. 
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C. This aggravating factor is established when monopolies use their ‘power attained in one 
market to gain a competitive advantage in another’,103 which can result in anti-competitive 
effects. O’Donoghue and Padilla suggested that these situations fit into two categories.104 
Firstly, ‘where an abuse occurs in an upstream dominant market but anti-competitive effects 
are felt in a downstream market’ where the monopoly is not necessarily dominant and 
secondly where the markets are horizontally integrated.105 In the latter, a monopoly in one of 
the two linking markets has the opportunity to gain ‘a dominant position on the markets in 
question as a whole’.106 The EC held Microsoft as a prime example of this aggravating 
factor107, which assisted in their ruling to enforce a compulsory licence.108 
 
D. In AKZO, the ECJ linked a predatory intention to the fact that AKZO’s prices were ’part of 
a plan for eliminating a competitor’.109 If the monopoly indicates ’a willingness to forsake 
short-term profits to achieve an anti-competitive end’,110 this constitutes a predatory intent.111 
It is evident that through objectively evaluating monopoly conduct, predatory intent can act 
as another entry barrier to a market. 
 
E. Follow-on innovation assesses whether the restriction or exclusion of competitors has 
caused any dynamic ‘inefficiency’. ‘The greater the creativity or improvement…[of the 
excluded competitors’,]…the more significant the follow-on innovation…to be foregone by 
allowing the…[monopolists]…refusal and, hence, the more substantial the anti-competitive 
                                                          
103 Ehlermann C., Gosling L., ‘European Competition Law Annual 1998: Regulating Communications 
Markets’ (2000) 1st ed. Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, p.239; also stated in Berkley Photo v 
Eastman Kodak Co [1979] 603 F. 2d 263 (2d Cir). 
104 O’Donoghue R., Padilla A., ‘The Law and Economics of Article 102’ (2006), 1st ed. Oxford: Hart, 
p.211–213. 
105 As per Kwok K., ‘A New Approach to Resolving Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights 
Disputes’, p.279. 
106 Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission [1996] ECR 5951, paras 28 and 31, as noted in 
O’Donoghue & Padilla, 212. 
107 Microsoft’s leveraging techniques: ‘(i) most organizations purchased both client OS and server OS; 
(ii) most customers of server OS ran Windows on their client PCs; (iii) Microsoft was active in both 
client OS and server OS…; and (v) technological links such as network effects existed between the 
two products’ - Kwok K., ‘A New Approach to Resolving Refusal to License Intellectual Property 
Rights Disputes’, p.279. 
108 It is likely that a monopoly, increasing their market power in a secondary market through 
leveraging, is going to place limits on other competitors and eventually exclude them from the industry 
entirely. This will therefore act as an aggravating factor under these two categories which will 
exacerbate anti-competitive effects in refusal to licence cases. 
109 It is for the competition authorities to assess whether conduct (such as adjustments to pricing) is 
intended to eliminate competition, as discussed by AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR 
3359, para 72. 
110 I.e. driving competitors out of the market which cannot afford to compete at these lower prices, as 
per Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398 (2004), para 409. 
111 Under Professor Baumol’s price reversal rule it would be deemed a price predatory ’if it forced a 
rival to leave the market and the predator thereafter reversed the price cut within the next several 
years‘: as per Bolton P., Brodley J., Riordan M., ‘Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy’ 
(2000) Law and Economics Working Paper No. 99-5, p.16. 
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effects’.112 O’Donoghue and Padilla designed a consumer demand test measuring the 
amount of follow-on innovation, stating that a: 
 
’new product B expands the market by bringing in consumers that were not interested in the 
product A,…but it would not be [new] if products A and B competed head-to-head for the 
same set of consumers’.113 
 
This test requires the market’s consumers to judge whether it has been fulfilled. However, 
considering these measures are only conclusive following the product’s introduction to the 
market, this test may be considered too late by many commentators.114 
 
F. The Line between the Protection of IPR and Incentives to Innovate: 
It has been established that the most common justification for a refusal to licence is to 
motivate IPR holders’ incentives to innovate. This reasoning was rejected in Microsoft 
because their protected IPR had ‘no causal link’ to the industry’s incentives to innovate. 
Reflecting on Microsoft’s ruling, as well as the few innovative firms left in that industry, 
commentators are concerned about the negative impact compulsory licencing will have on 
the industry’s future inventive activity. This strongly echoes Schumpeter’s view that IPR must 
be defended, as competition policies command a decisive cost of quality advantage which 
strikes at the foundation of IPR and acts as a ‘perennial gale of creative destruction’.115 
 
Critics endorsed Schumpeter’s view on the grounds that it identifies how ‘industries…vary 
too much for one theory to fit all’.116 Similar to Schumpeter’s view and Crane’s industry-
based assessment, Carrier designed an approach assessing the link between the protection 
of IPR and incentives to innovate. Carrier’s method depends on three factors, the markets’: 
primary incentives, degree of dependence on IPR and category of innovation (i.e. whether a 
complex or discrete nature)117. 
 
 
 
                                                          
112 Kwok K., ‘A New Approach to Resolving Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights Disputes’, 
p.282. 
113 O’Donoghue R., Padilla A., ‘The Law and Economics of Article 102’ (2006) 1st ed. Oxford: Hart, 
p.447-448. 
114 Leveque F., Shelanski H., ‘Antitrust, Patents and Copyright: EU and US Perspectives’ (2005) 1st 
ed, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, p.106. 
115 Schumpeter J., ‘Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy’, p.84. 
116 Carlton D., Gertner R., ‘Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Strategic Behaviour’ (2003) Volume 3, 
Innovation Policy and the Economy, Available: http://www.nber.org/papers/w8976. Last assessed 6th 
December 2015. 
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Conclusion: 
It has been proven that Microsoft possesses significant market-based incentives including 
network effects and first-mover competitive advantages.118 Additionally, and in contrast to 
IMS’ innovations,119 Microsoft’s products appear to be relatively easier to produce and not as 
easy to replicate. Applying Carrier’s industry-based assessment, it is identified that the anti-
competitive effects of Microsoft’s refusal to licence far outweighed its pro-competitive 
effects.120 This could have been presumed considering the software industry is known for its 
continuous game-changing innovations. In contrast, the pharmaceutical industry presents 
relatively discrete inventions to improve their original system.121 As such, if IMS was judged 
through Carrier’s analysis, the outcome would have been more difficult to assess than in 
Microsoft. This indicates that facilitating an industry-based approach could result in false 
‘convictions’, which may inadvertently cause other anti-competitive activities.122 Furthermore, 
to fulfil the three components of Carrier's test, every industry considered would be placed 
under the magnifying glass by the authorities’.123 This would ensure that an extensive 
evaluation of the firm’s industry was conducted to identify its innovative features prior to any 
ruling, providing a degree of administrability to the interface between competition policy and 
IPR. The concern with this application is that the test neglects to consider the impact these 
anti-competitive practices have on consumers. By solely focusing on the innovative side of 
the argument, as is implied, the courts may accidentally ignore this consideration. If so, it 
should be noted that Carrier’s approach only achieves a degree of administrability by over-
simplifying the conflict in question.124 
 
Alternatively, Kaplow’s proposed framework provides a more thorough analysis of the 
industries and remains the most sophisticated device when resolving the interface between 
                                                          
118 Evidenced in Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2004] ECR 2977. 
119 Evidenced in IMS Health Judgment, where NDC was able to replicate IMS’ brick structure without 
being granting a licence. 
120 As such, Carrier M., ‘Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox’, pp.761, 818–833 supports the 
court’s analysis in Microsoft. 
121 IMS’s brick structure made the original product easier to distribute and the system easier to 
navigate. Considering how long their original product took to form, the industry is less likely to 
undergo the cost of creating an entirely new product when improving the original invention is still an 
viable option. 
122 I.e. agreements to collude: Cass R., Hylton K., ‘Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards and Microsoft’ (1999) 8 (1), George Mason Law Review, pp.31-32. 
123 Carried out by the Chief Competition Economist Office within the Commission. For more detail 
explanation see Gavill A., The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralised and Privatised 
European Competition Policy System: Lessons from the American Experience (2007) 4, Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics, pp.177,183. 
124 Therefore proving to be insufficient in practice, as identifying what type of innovation exists in an 
industry does not make the potential consumer harm of these anti-competitive practices any less 
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competition law and IPR.125 When examining Kaplow’s ratio test in section four, two 
omissions in its framework were identified. Firstly, the lack of guidance on how the 
relationship between IPR rewards and innovation incentives should be applied in the 
analysis. Second, the test does not consider in enough depth how the anti-competitive 
behaviour hinders cumulative innovation, nor its importance to the market. 
 
In respect of the former omission, Kaplow’s interpretation is that permitting anti-competitive 
behaviour can increase IPR holders’ return in super-normal profits, thereby increasing the 
amount of investment placed in innovation, which improves consumer welfare and economic 
growth.126 However, the concerning aspect of this chain of causation, is how can the court 
identify whether the IPR holders’ supernormal reward has provided an incentive to 
innovate?127 With regard to the latter omission, cumulative innovation has been identified as 
a driver of technological development. Therefore, if there is a loss in cumulative innovation, 
this signifies an IP cost, which must be integrated into the ratio to provide a superior analysis 
for the industry. Without this concept being considered in Kaplow’s anaylsis, it is arguable 
that no successful or permanent balance is obtainable. 
 
An alternative temporary process to Kaplow’s approach could be the introduction of a 
‘fundamental premise’…that innovators will continue to produce innovations as long as their 
innovation costs are fully compensated’.128 This premise would allow courts to concentrate 
more directly on advancing consumer welfare without impairing the IPR holders’ incentives 
to innovate. Similar to the proposal illustrated by Schumpeter, this process would cause 
innovators (IPR holders) to undertake R&D. As per Schumpeter's proposal, by inducing firms 
to innovate, the competition authorities need to accept the potential consequence in ’the 
creation of monopolies as a necessary evil’.129 This interpretation does not mean that 
competition authorities should be prevented from interfering in the management of IPR, 
however it does present an element of restriction placed on their involvement.  
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Although Carrier’s approach proves to have various positive attributes, it refuses to consider 
a fundamental conflict between these two areas of law. Therefore, it is unlikely its application 
would produce a fully formed balance. Kaplow’s approach has been identified as the most 
sophisticated proposal in terms of striking a balance between competition policy and IPR, 
however, until the omissions in its processes are rectified, a fully workable balance will also 
be unattainable within its framework, despite it having the most potential. 
 
The other frameworks introduced, which instead focus on ‘how’ a refusal to licence interacts 
with different aggregated circumstantial factors, have presented an opportunity for a balance 
between competition and IP law.130 However, considering this proposal has only been 
applied theoretically, it would be unadvisable to adopt as the new legal standard in this 
conflict, at least until it has been successfully applied in practice. 
 
In the absence of that ideal, and for the substantial reasons advanced above, the 
‘fundamental premise’ between innovators and the competition authorities will help to permit 
a temporary resolution, achieving optimal consumer welfare and economic growth in the 
short-term. Although there is a general confidence that, in time, a balanced approach to the 
IP-competition law interface will emerge, further analysis and practical application of these 
separate (and possibly new) approaches is crucial before any definitive answer is provided 
regarding ‘which approach is superior’. 
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